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Abstract:

This paper will outline the key elements of an ongoing research project. The main focus of the 
project is to explore the application of new technology to the study of key works of modernism, 
whilst simultaneously arguing that modernism can itself oﬀer fresh perspectives on contemporary 
digital art. I am interested in the way key works of modernism present the artwork as both an 
object to be experienced and as a structured theory of knowledge. This tension can be seen most 
obviously in such canonical works as Ezra Pound’s Cantos (1917-1969) where his aesthetic of the 
‘luminous fragment’ is set against the poem’s larger, Dantescan, vision of history. A similar 
balance is to be found in Aby Warburg’s Mnemosyne Atlas (1924-1929), ostensibly a work of 
historical scholarship tracing the evolution of visual tropes (‘pathosformel’) from Classical to 
Renaissance art, but also a work that has significant aﬃnities with modernist aesthetics in its 
deployment and recombination of visual fragments. 

For a new Mnemosyne: Art, Experience, and Technology

My aim today is sketch the origins of a developing research project. The main focus of which is to 
explore the application of new technology to the study of key works of modernism, whilst 
simultaneously arguing that modernism, and its critical penumbra, can itself oﬀer fresh 
perspectives on contemporary digital art - it’s this aspect that I will focus on here. 

I am concerned specifically with how modernism presents the artwork as both an object to be 
experienced and as a structured theory of knowledge. 

This tension can be seen most obviously in such canonical works as Ezra Pound’s Cantos 
(1917-1969) where his ideogrammic aesthetic of the ‘luminous fragment’ is set against the poem’s 
larger, Dantescan, vision of history. This is outlined by Pound in a letter written to his father in 
1927, about a decade into his work on the poem and three years before the first volume, a Draft 
of XXX Cantos, would be published.

A similar balance is to be found in Aby Warburg’s Mnemosyne Atlas (1924-1929), ostensibly a 
work of historical scholarship tracing the evolution of so-called ‘emotive formulas’ (pathosformel) 
from Classical to Renaissance art, but also a work that has significant aﬃnities with modernist 
aesthetics in its deployment and recombination of visual fragments. 

More recently, the French filmmaker Jean-Luc Godard’s Histoire(s) du cinema (1988-1998), which 
I would describe as a late-modernist work, is both an account of film history and a radical video-
based reworking of the aesthetics of montage. Finally, Chris Marker’s Immemory (1998), an early 
experiment in digital art, deploys a Proustian model of involuntary memory to explore connections 
between film, history, and autobiography. 

In each case a tension arises between the ordering of experience into a narrative (however loosely 
defined) and the presentation of the work as a broader theorisation of knowledge. 

In some ways, this could be conceptualised as a tension between epistemology and 
phenomenology; of the artwork as an object to be experienced, or as a tool through which the 
world is understood. To take a linguistic analogy, it is the artwork seen as either a noun or a verb. 

Numerous examples exist of digital art using data-modelling techniques to create visual and aural 
representations, but these have largely eschewed theorisations of how structure and experience 
are correlated. Modernism would seem then to oﬀer a series of methodologies that have the 
potential to present new ways of approaching digital art. I intend to investigate the history of this 
work in greater detail, and to suggest how the legacies of modernism might oﬀer clues to its 
further development. 

At the beginning of 2016, two exhibitions were running concurrently in London, both of which 
sought to explore the interface between art and technology.

In East London, the Whitechapel Gallery’s Electronic Superhighway – its title a reference to the 
term coined by that pioneer of electronic art, Nam June-Paik – traced the interface between art 
and the internet in the half-century from 1966 to the present-day. 

Rather than adopting a conventional chronology, the exhibition began with contemporary work 
and worked backwards to the earliest examples. Along the way, visitors could explore works that 
ranged from Lynn Hershman Leeson’s interactive videos which distorted the codes of 1980s 
daytime soap-operas, to the Instagram myth-making of Amalia Ulman, and experience the various 
ways in which artists have used the practice and the promise of the internet to explore visions 
veering from the utopian to the banal - and occasionally the banally utopian. 

Across this span of time, two factors stood out: first, the old cliché, that nothing dates as quickly 
as an earlier vision of the future still holds sway: 8-bit madeleines conjuring up a dial-up rush of 
nostalgia; evolutionary dead-ends like CD-I momentarily brought back to life. And second the 
tension between distraction and contemplation (which characterised for Walter Benjamin the 
experience of the first spectators of modernity) seems equally to apply their contemporary 
descendants. 

On the one hand, here were works which sought to dazzle the spectator: on entering the 
exhibition, the first thing one was treated to was the spectacle of Jacolby Satterwhite’s video 
installation, Reifying Desire VI, which transmogrified a queer New York flânerie into a writhing 
digital polymorphous pornotopia. 

Not everything was such fun. Orphaned technologies, briefly reanimated, only served as a 
reminder of how recalcitrant and clumsy these objects could be. Did they always possess this 
lumpen inarticulacy, or were they once some acme of contemporaneity? And if so, how will our 
latest innovations appear to generations yet unborn?

There was much to enjoy, yet an anxiety remained: what am I meant to do with this stuﬀ? What 
mode of attention do I adopt? Somehow, the majority of the works seemed too removed from 
traditional visual art to experience as straightforward aesthetic objects or placed into art history 
(despite occasional aﬃnities with various schools of abstraction or conceptualism), and yet their 
call to other modes of engagement seemed ill-suited to their environment. This was both physical 
– how should I sit or stand in relation to this work? – but also mental: what do I draw from this 
experience? Two hours spent in this state of curiosity proved beguiling, but also oddly exhausting 
– what had I seen, and had I seen enough of it?  

A few miles away, in one of Somerset House’s cavernous riverside basements, and across a 
grand courtyard from the Courtauld Gallery, these anxieties stirred again. Visitors to Big Bang 
Data were indulged in a state-of-the-art demonstration of how artists are making use of the 
unimaginable proliferation of data that modern technology generates, and which has come 
increasingly to follow our every move, and even dictate our behaviours. The remit of the exhibition 
was, in the words of its curators, to “explore[s] the issues surrounding the datafication of our 
world through the work of artists, designers, journalists and visionaries. As the data explosion 
accelerates, we ask if we really understand our relationship with data, and explore the meaning 
and implications of data for our future.”

But how should this datafication be presented, and what is meant by 'understanding' in this 
context? 

In one room, under a domed canopy, Lise Autogena and Josh Portway’s Black Shoals, Dark 
Matter, created a shimmering aquarium-cum-airport of data depicting live financial transactions as 
they happened. Bathed in a soft-blue glow - perhaps the signature colour of data-driven art - 
spectators watched the shoaling swarms, slumbering masters of a limpid universe. A seemingly 
occult world brought briefly into visibility.

In the same room, Julie Freeman’s installation We Need Us drew on internet meta-data to create a 
series of pulsing habitats, from jungle glade to cellular microcosm. Here, data was transformed 
into pure signifier - suﬃcient merely to know that this work was created from data rather than 
knowing what it was intended to represent.

Perhaps the best exemplar of this work, however, was Ryoji Ikeda’s installation, data.tron begun in 
2007 and reconfigured numerous times since. 

The work is characterised by its creator as:

"data.tron is part of the datamatics project, a series of experiments that explore such questions 
both physically and mathematically. Visitors will experience the vast universe of data in the infinite 
between 0 and 1.”

data.tron is an audiovisual installation in which each single pixel of visual image is strictly 
calculated by mathematical principle, composed from a combination of pure mathematics and the 
vast sea of data present in the world. These images are projected onto a large screen, heightening 
and intensifying the visitor's perception and total immersion within the work.

The version I saw at Somerset House created a wall-sized projection, partially screened oﬀ from 
the gallery, allowing spectators to bathe in isolation in its cascade of data. It was mesmerising, 
but what was it that mesmerised? Were the images enough on their own - or was the eﬀect of the 
work in part necessitated by the knowledge that here was data. The normally hidden brought out 
into the open by the action of the artist? 

In much the same way as a nineteenth century romantic painter like Caspar David Friedrich 
sought to represent the encounter between man and an overwhelming nature, so today’s artists 
appear exist on the edge of a technological sublime; rather than Friedrich’s Rider of the Sea of 
Mist, here we vanish into a virtuality: Hegelian absolute spirit replaced by Kurzweil’s singularity. 

Technology thus seems to serve a twofold purpose here - it is both the source-code for the 
representations we experience, and the subject of those representations. The human subject 
stands, necessarily, apart.

One of the most engaging works was created by the design studio Tekja, whose London Data 
Streams sought to provide a mobile snapshot through mapping Twitter, Instagram, and TFL data 
onto a pulsing map of the city. Tekja it should be noted is a design studio whose slogan ‘Turning 
data in knowledge’ hints at the logic that underpins much of this work.

In both exhibitions, one overriding impression persisted despite the spectacle: the relationship 
between art-object (however construed) and the spectator seemed rooted in a surprisingly 
conventional metaphysics; in some ways compounding Michael Fried's critique of the counter-
intuitive 'theatricality' of minimal art in his essay 'Art and Objecthood' from the late 1960s. 

This would seem, therefore to be the central dilemma of this work: torn between visualising data 
as pure signal or pure noise places the viewing subject in either a position of god-like mastery or 
as subservient ape. However, in both views, there is the sense that the work in some way is the 
data itself, rooting the connection between thing and representation in classical metaphysics. 
These superficially radical works seem on closer inspection to adopt a surprisingly conservative 
approach to their understanding of the work of art and its relation to an external reality.

In seeking to challenge this, I want to turn first to the work of the poet and theorist, Veronica 
Forrest-Thomson, who, writing in the mid-1970s, claimed what she termed 'poetic artifice' as the 
defining quality of how poetic language may be distinguished from its ordinary usage. Her attitude 
is perhaps most simply encapsulated in the subtitle of her poem Cordelia: 'a Poem should not 
mean, but Be' – a line she borrows from the end of Archibald MacLeish's Ars poetica. 

Her major contribution to poetic theory came in the posthumously published (and recently 
reissued) book also called ‘Poetic Artifice’. In this work, she argues that traditional approaches to 
poetic language (both in the poems themselves and in their critical interlocutors) try - erroneously 
– to naturalise it in relation to the non-poetic world. This ignores, she argues, the degree to which 
artifice is central to our understanding of how poetry functions linguistically. 

She writes:

“Do not forget,', says Wittgenstein, 'that a poem, even though it is composed of the language of 
information is not used in the language-game of giving information.' It is indeed important to 
remember this, but simply remembering it is no solution. We must try to describe the language 
game in which poetic language is used, and here the initial diﬃculty is the relationship between 
the language-game of poetry and what Wittgenstein calls the language-game of giving 
information.”

Drawing on an example from TS Eliot she notes that,

“The sentence, 'Pipit sat upright in her chair some distance from where I was sitting' could be 
used to give information about a state of aﬀairs in the external world: namely, that at a particular 
time in the past someone named Pipit sat at some distance from the person who is uttering the 
sentence. But when Eliot begins his poem 'A Cooking Egg' with these lines:

	 Pipit sate upright in her chair

	 	 Some distance from where I was sitting;

the function of the sentence, and in particular its relationship to the external world, changes. The 
statement is altered by its insertion in a poetic context, by its use, shall we say, in this diﬀerent 
language-game. It no longer refers to a particular time in the past (it is not simply irrelevant to ask 
whether the event took place on 3 April 1912 or at some other time: there is no need to suppose 
such an event at all). Nor need the 'I' be thought of as a particular person. For the purposes of the 
poem the 'I' is simply a voice.”

From this, she concludes from that,

“Every reader of poetry knows that statements are changed by their insertion in a poem, that they 
no longer mean what they mean in ordinary speech because of the form in which they appear. To 
state the relationship between poetry and the external world, however – to show precisely how 
poetic form and poetic context aﬀect the sentences they include and the non-verbal world which 
the sentences imply - is diﬃcult.”

(1978, X)

The analogy I would draw with the data-based works described above follows precisely this 
argument: composed of data that was initially part of the language-game of giving information, it 
has now been transformed into a new language-game where this should longer apply. 

Many of the examples I have looked at so far are composed in the language of giving information 
deceive us into assuming that information is what they are still doing: it appears to operate as if 
we were still playing by the rules of the old game. Can new technology ever be used to do more 
than merely provide images or models for the datafication of our reality? Modernist poetics, in its 
focus on both the material conditions under which meaning is generated, and its understanding of 
the grammar through which meaning derives would seem to make it ideally suited to this search. 

***

The line of Wittgenstein comes, as many people will know, from a series of notes, discovered in a 
box file after his death, and published with the name he had given them: Zettel. They are a book 
of disquiet, ranging far and wide in subject matter and were written between 1929 and 1945. This 
line is also used by Marjorie Perloﬀ as the opening epigraph to her book Wittgenstein’s Ladder. In 
some way, her stance in relation to Wittgenstein’s own work mirrors this; as Gareth Farmer notes 
in his new introduction to Poetic Artifice, she reviewed the book on its first publication - and it 
appears to have influenced her own Radical Artifice published a decade later.

However, in the Wittgenstein book, she writes:

“As someone trained in literary criticism rather than philosophy, I make no claim to contributing to 
the ongoing (and enormous) body of writing that seeks to explain the diﬃcult meanings in 
Wittgenstein's endlessly riddling philosophical writings. Rather, I want to examine the relationship 
of Wittgenstein's mode of investigation, in all its contradictoriness, its stringent and severe self-
revision and critique, its cryptic and aphoristic formulations and epiphanies, to the "ordinary 
language" poetry so central to our own time. For if, as Wittgenstein posits, "Language is not 
contiguous to anything else" (LEC1 112), then its most trivial manifestations become interesting.”

The context of this particular aphorism is worth noting, although I have not the time today to 
explore its context in greater detail.

155. A poet's words can pierce us. And that is, of course causally connected with the use they 
have in our life. And it is also connected with the way in which, conformably to this use, we let our 
thoughts roam up and down in the familiar surroundings of the words.

156. Is there a diﬀerence of meaning that can be explained and another that does not come out in 
an explanation?

157. Soulful expression in music – this cannot be recognized by rule. Why can't we imagine that it 
might be, by other beings?

158. If a theme, a phrase, suddenly means something to you, you don't have to be able to explain 
it. Just this gesture has been made accessible to you.

159. But do you speak of understanding music. You understand it, surely, while you hear it! Ought 
we to say this is an experience which accompanies hearing?

160. The way music speaks. Do not forget that a poem, even though it is composed in the 
language of information, is not used in the language-game of giving information.

I want to conclude today by returning to one of my earliest examples. It has become something of 
a contemporary commonplace to equate the mnemo-technics of Renaissance occultism with 
contemporary digital technology: I have outlined elsewhere the apparent aﬃnities between Giulio 
Camillo's Theatre of Memory and works by Godard and Marker. And in the recently published 
Mnemosyne: a History of the arts of Memory, François Boutonnet  has gone into far greater detail 
than I the connections between ancient and modern theories of memory - drawing on and 
developing the seminal work of Frances Yates, and the more recent attempts by Alain-Philippe 
Michaud and Georges Didi-Huberman to extend Aby Warburg's pioneering iconography into the 
information age.  

Nevertheless, there are aﬃnities worth making with the data-driven art I have discussed. If these 
were essentially humanist in their conception - the systems designed as prosthetics to augment 
human - these new models necessarily position themselves as outside of human comprehension, 
so the only way they can be encountered is as model, as aesthetic. This speaks to a larger 
dilemma for art in the Information Age - has its role been reduced to mere explainer of scientific 
truth, or can envisage a new role? In this sense, this boundary between the work of art and the 
work of scholarship seems an especially fertile one. 

Concluding his essay on the frescoes of the Palazzo Schifanoia in Ferrara, Warburg argues that 
these showed the complex interaction between astrology and a nascent astronomy - but more 
significantly, the oﬀered him a methodological typos for his approach:

“Until now, a lack of of adequate general evolutionary categories has impeded art history in 
placing its materials at the disposal of the – still unwritten – "historical psychology of human 
expression." By adopting either an unduly materialistic or an unduly mystical stance, our young 
discipline blocks its own panoramic view of history. It gropes toward an evolutionary theory of its 
own, somewhere between the schematisms of political history and then dogmatic faith in genius. 
In attempting to elucidate the frescoes of the Palazzo Schifanoia in Ferrara, I hope to have shown 
how an iconological analysis that can range freely, with no fear or border guards, and can treat the 
ancient, medieval, and modern worlds as a coherent historical unity – an analysis that can 
scrutinize the purest and the most utilitarian of arts as equivalent documents of expression – how 
such a method, by taking pains to illuminate one single obscurity, can cast light on great an 
evolutionary processes in all their interconnectedness. I have not tried to find a neat solution so 
much as to present a new problem, which I would formulate as follows: "To what extent can the 
stylistic shift in the presentation of human beings in Italian art be regarded as part of an 
international process of dialectical engagement with the surviving imagery of Eastern 
Mediterranean pagan culture?

Our sense of wonder at the inexplicable fact of supreme artistic achievement can only be 
enhanced by the awareness that genius is both a gift of grace and a conscious dialectical energy. 
The grandeur of the new art, as given to us by the genius of Italy, had its roots in the shared 
determination to strip the humanist heritage of Greece of all its accretions of traditional "practice," 
whether medieval, Oriental, or Latin. It was with this desire to restore the ancient world that "the 
good European" began his battle for enlightenment, in that age of internationally migrating images 
that we – a shade too mystically – call the Age of the Renaissance.” (585-6) 

It may be too simplistic to map Warburg's art-historical model, composed as it is of a few 
hundred photographic reproductions with, mistaking a solar-system for a galaxy. Nevertheless, I 
want to conclude by suggesting that the way Warburg conceives of the mobility of the image 
might provide us with a model for thinking about visualisations of data that recognises them not 
as representations or as metaphors, but as something more complex and dynamic . 

